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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Disclosure of Identity of Informant Required
In Order to Allow Challenge To Validity of Arrest
-The defendant was arrested for selling and possessing heroin by police officers who acted without
a warrant on information obtained from an informant. At the time of his arrest, the defendant
was found to be in possession of heroin and certain
bills that had previously been dusted with fluorescent powder and had been used by the informant
to purchase heroin from him. At the trial, the
defendant challenged the validity of his arrest on
which admissibility of this evidence depended and
demanded to know the identity of the informant.
The police officers refused to disclose the informer's
identity, claiming that it was privileged. The
California District Court of Appeal, in reversing
the defendant's conviction, held that the informant's identity must be disclosed in order to
support the arrest without a warrant where the
informer's testimony might have been beneficial
to the defendant in showing that the police did not
have reasonable grounds for the arrest. People v.
McShann, 321 P.2d 533 (Calif. App. 1958).
On the voir dire to determine whether reasonable grounds for the defendant's arrest existed,
the court said that the defendant was entitled to
produce evidence to rebut the showing of the
officers that they had reasonable grounds to believe that a felony was being committed. Since
the informant's testimony might be of material

benefit to the defendant in showing that the officer
did not have reasonable grounds to justify an
arrest without a warrant, the court felt that the
defendant was entitled to have access to the informant on this issue. "It is just as important to a
defendant to have access to a material witness
who may satisfy the court that evidence against
him should be excluded because it was obtained as
a result of an illegal search and seizure as it is to
have access to material witnesses who may give
evidence which will result in overcoming in the
eyes of the jury the prosecution's evidence against
him on the merits of the charge." The court also
stated, that since the informant was a participant
in the alleged unlawful sale of heroin and was then
a material witness and the only person other than
the defendant who could furnish direct evidence
pertaining to the sale, the privilege against disclosure of the informant must give way to the
defendant's right to have an opportunity to produce such a witness.

ments, respondent did not move to quash but went to
trial on one indictment and pleaded nolo contendere to
another. He now, in effect, seeks to attack the indictments collateraly and have us go behind the convictions.
If actual fraud in the commission of an offense involves
moral turpitude, and we so hold, then respondent'sconvictions under unchallenged indictments charging fraud
establishes moral turpitude and summary disciplinary
action was properly invoked on the records of the convicting court." (Emphasis added.)
The court then distinguished the three cases which
had been decided prior to the Teitelbaum decision and
had held the other way. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v.
illcAfee was distinguished on the ground that the income tax evasion in that case was prosecuted under
section 145(a). Baker v. Miller was distinguished on the
ground that the result there reached was due to that
court's interpretation of the federal law on the subject.
The Illinois court noted that the law of Chanan Din
Khan, a recent federal case, was contrary to the Indiana
case. (See footnote 22, supra.) The court noted that its
decision was contra to that of the leading case
of Hallinan, but chose not to follow that decision.
Hallinan, it will be remembered, specifically rejected
any contention that words added to the indictment by
a careful or over-zealous prosecutor could be the basis
of any decision holding that fraud is involved in a violation of section 145 (b). The Illinois court, in Teitel-

baum, not only refused to follow the lead of Hallinan
on this phase of the case, but instead made the allegation of fraud in the indictment the very foundation of
its holding.
The decision in Teitelbaum apparently rejects the
theory that fraud is an inlherent and necessary element
of income tax evasion. Though the result reached in
the Teitelbaum case was certainly a correct one, it is
submitted that it would have been more desirable to
hold that any income tax evasion conviction involving
a "willful-intent-to-evade element" necessarily involves
fraud and, therefore, moral turpitude, rather than rely
on an allegation of fraud in the indictment as the basis
of the decision. Whatever conflict may have existed
among the earlier federal cases (see footnote 16, supra),
the latest authority supports this contention. Chanon
Din Khan v. Barber, 147 F.Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1957)
and Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.
1957). Further support is found in the Seijas case, the
most recent state disbarm.nt case before Teitelbaum,
which was not mentioned by the Illinois court, although
in that case an attorney was summarily disbarred because moral turpitude was found to be necessarily involved in income tax evasion. The weakness of the
Teitelbaumu opinion would seem to be that in any subsequent. case where fraud is not alleged in the indictment a summary proceeding will not be available in
Illinois.

Exposure to jury Of Defense Counsel's Tampering With Evidence Violated Defendant's Constitutional Rights-A police officer was killed in a
gun battle between the defendant, who was a
wanted criminal, and police officers who had set
up a road block in an attempt to capture him. The
bullet that killed the officer passed through his
belt buckle. The guns of the officers &ere all .38

CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMAI FNTS

calibre, while the defendant had a .22 calibre pistol.
At the trial, the belt buckle of the deceased policeman was introduced in evidence and testimony
indicated that the hole in it had been made by a
.22 calibre bullet. During a recess in the trial, the
defendant's counsel, while alone in the courtroom,
took a wooden dowel and was pushing it down
into the bullet hole in the belt buckle, materially
altering its size, when the district attorney caught
him in the act. The trial was delayed for a short
time while the attorneys conferred with the judge.
When the trial was resumed, and in the presence
of the jury, the district attorney asked, and received, permission to state the foregoing facts for
the record. Defendant's counsel admitted that he
had changed the size of the bullet hole. The
judge's only comment was a warning to the jury
not to further tamper with the evidence when they
retired to the jury room. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. After fruitlessly
pursuing his appropriate state remedies he applied
for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district
court. The writ was granted and the defendant
was freed, subject to the right of re-arrest by the
state and a subsequent new trial, on the ground
that he had been denied his constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel. Grandsiugcr v.
Bovey, 153 F. Supp. 201 (Neb. 1957).
In a strongly worded opinion, the court condemned the actions of defendant's counsel as
"furtive" and "dishonest" and a deliberate attempt to distort a critical piece of evidence. It was
conduct, the court said, for which the attorney
could be subject to punishment for contempt of
court and even permanent disbarment. He had
the choice between "cooperating" with the district attorney and acknowledging his actions before the jury and denying the incident and
representing the defendant as vigorously as possible. He "patently", said the court, chose the
former alternative, thereby attempting to save
himself while "betraying" the defendant.
"In that instant and by that display, what had theretofore been an orderly trial was perverted into a virtual legal lynching. From that time forward, Mr.
Fisher stood discredited before the jury in respect of
petitioner's case."
The state claimed that such actions were all on
the part of defendant's counsel and that it was
without fault. This contention was rejected. Once
the misdeed had occurred, the court said, it was
turned into a dramatic incident paraded before
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the jury by the prosecutor to counsel's "humiliation

and disgrace and petitioner's immense peril."
Moreover, tbe court concluded that the trial
judge was not without fault. It would have been
preferable to declare a mistrial, regardless of the
loss of time and money or even a possible subsequent double jeopardy defense, than to permit
such a flagrant violation of the defendant's rights.
On these grounds, the court said, it was not within
the province of the state to disclaim all responsibility for what occurred and to exclaim, "Shake
not thy gory locks at me, nor say I (lid it."
Loss of Citizenship For Desertion as Cruel And
Unusual Punishment---The petitioner was convicted of desertion in wartime and dishonorably
discharged from the military service. lie later
applied for a passport and it was refused because
the Nationality Act of 1940, U.S.C.A. §1481 (a)
(8) (g), provides that those convicted of wartime
desertion, and dishonorably discharged from the
service, lose their American citizenship. Petitioner
brought suit in a United States District Court for
a declaratory judgment that he was a citizen. The
court granted the government summary judgment
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that loss of citizenship as a punishment for the
crime of desertion, was one of a cruel and unusual
nature forbidden by the eighth amendment. Trop
v. Dulles, 26 Law Week 4219 (March 31, 1958).
In a case decided the same day, Perez v. Brownnell, 26 Law Week 4206 (March 31, 1958), the
Supreme Court held that it was within the power
of the government to take away the citizenship of
a native born American. For the majority of the
Court tile question was whether or not the denationalization bore a reasonable relationship to a
specific power of Congress. Thus the question was
essentially one of due process. In that case the
citizen had voted in a foreign political election and
it was held that by so doing he lost his citizenship
because this act interfered with the government's
conduct of foreign affairs. The dissent denied the
government had any power to take away the
citizenship of a native born American--that citizenship could only be relinquished by some voluntary act.
In light of the Perez case, it became necessary to
find some other basis for restoring Trop's citizenship if that was to.be done. In the opinion of Chief
justice Warren and three other members of the
Court who had (lissenled in the Perez case, that
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basis was the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. To reach
this conclusion it was necessary to find first that
loss of citizenship was a criminal penalty and a
punishment for the crime of desertion; for if it was
merely a regulation of nationality the eighth
amendment would not apply. The Court found
that the loss of citizenslip was indeed a penalty
because:
"The purpose of taking away citizenship from a convicted deserter is simply to punish him. There is no
other legitimate purpose that the statute could serve.
Denationalization in this case is not even claimed to be
a means of solving international problems, as was
argued in Perez. Here the purpose is punishment, and
therefore, the statute is a penal law."
Wartime desertion is punishable by the death
penalty but the Court put this argument to one
side, ". . . the existence of the death penalty is not
a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination."
The loss of citizenship involves "... the total
destruction of the individual's status in organized
society," said Chief Justice Warren. An American
who loses his citizenship is an alien in this country
and has only the rights of an alien. And even these
limited rights may be lost if the government wishes
to deport him. No other country is, of course, obligated to admit an alien. "In short, the expatriate
has lost the right to have rights."
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority
opinion in the Perez case, spoke for the dissenters
in Trop. In applying the due process test of the
Perez case he found a rational relationship between
the power of the government to take away citizenship for desertion and the government's war
powers.
"It is not for us to deny that Congress might reasonably have believed the morale and fighting efficiency
of our troops would be impaired if our soldiers know
that their fellows who had abandoned them in their
time of greatest need were to remain in the communion of our citizens."
The dissent also disagreed with the Warren
opinion on the question of whether or not this
deprivation of citizenship was a penal action. This
statute was no different, the dissent argued, than
one which takes away the voting rights of a convicted felon. And even assuming that the statute
imposed a penalty, it was not of a cruel or unusual

nature because the loss of citizenship was not a
fate worse than death and the death penalty had
never been considered cruel or unusual.
The swing man in the Trop decision was Justice
Brennan. He had voted with the majority in Perez
on the ground that deprivation of citizenship for
voting in a foreign political election had a reasonable relationship to the power of the government to
conduct foreign affairs. Applying this due process
test in the Trop case, however, he joined with the
majority in determining that there were no
grounds for depriving Trop of his citizenship because of his desertion. This was so, he declared,
because:
"It is difficult, indeed, to see how expatriation of
the deserter helps wage war except as it performs that
function when imposed as punishment. It is obvious
that expatriation cannot in any wise avoid the harm
apprehended by Congress. After the act of desertion,
only punishment can follow, for the harm has been
done."
Since the "requisite rational relation" between
the war power and the deprivation of citizenship
was not apparent to Justice Brennan, he voted
with the majority and Trop and more than 7,000
other wartime deserters regained their citizenship.
Business And Pleasure Trips Not 'Absences
From Jurisdiction For Purpose of Statute of
Limitations-The defendant was indicted for income tax evasion and he moved to dismiss the
first two counts of the indictment on the ground
that the six year statute of limitations on such
actions had run. The government contended that
(1) by instituting the complaint before a state
justice of the peace, in the absence of a United
States Commissioner, the time for instituting the
prosecution was extended and that (2) the defendant, by making frequent business and pleasure
trips outside the district in which he was indicted,
had tolled the statute of limitations. The court
held for the defendant and dismissed the two
counts of the indictment. United Stales v. Gross,
159 F. Supp. 316 (D.C. Nev. 1958).
This case involved the construction of the six
year statute of limitations applicable to prosecution for evasions of the income tax laws which
provided:
"...The time during which the person committing
any of the offenses above mentioned is absent from the
district wherein the same is committed shall not be
taken as any part of the time limited by law for the
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commencement of such proceedings. Where a complaint
is instituted before a commissioner of the United States
within the period above limited, the time shall be extended until the discharge of the grand jury at its next
session within the district." 26 U.S.C. §3748 (a) (3).
The government first argued that the period for
commencing the prosecution had been extended
by instituting a complaint before a state ju:,tice of
the peace. This type of proceeding was a mere
formality, the government said, and because the
United States Commissioner in Reno was out of
the district, it was proper to institute the proceeding before the justice of the peace, who would be a
"properly qualified magistrate" in other criminal
prosecutions under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The court rejected this contention, noting that other United States Commissioners within the district had been available and
that a local justice of the peace "is simply not
synonymous with a commissioner of the United
States."
The government's main argument concerned
the interpretation of the phrase "absent from the
district" in the statue. The defendant conceded
that he had spent a total of 137 days outside the
district during the six year period of the statute of
limitations and that the indictment would have
been timely if these 137 days were such absences
from the district as tolled the statute. The court
noted that there was a conflict on the interpretation of this phrase in the lower federal courts and
chose to follow those cases which had held that
such trips did not toll the statute. The court noted
that "absent from the district" had been substituted for the phrase "fleeing from the jurisdiction"
in an earlier law. Moreover, the court pointed out
that the phrase "absent from the district" was
one usually found in civil statutes where the problem was one of obtaining personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. There is no requirement that the
defendant be present in the district when he is
indicted in a criminal case. The statute is to tolled
only where

"....

the defendant's absence either

indicates 'flight' from justice or substantially impairs and impedes the investigatory and enforcement functions of the Government."
Overseas Civilian Army Employees Subject to
Court Martial-The petitioner, a civilian employee
of the Army, was convicted of larceny by an Army
court-martial in Morocco. He brought an action
for habeas corpus in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, claiming that he could not
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constitutionally be tried by a court-martial in view
of the Supreme Court's decisions in United States
ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (which
held that the Army could not try by court-martial
a member of the Army who had been discharged
and was then a civilian) and Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957) (which held that the army had no
jurisdiction over the civilian dependents of a member of the Army). The court rejected this claim and
held that the employee, though a civilian, could
constitutionally be tried by an overseas courtmartial. United States ex rel Guagliardov. McElroy,
158 F. Supp. 171 (1958).
The court noted that the Constitution gives to
the Congress the power to make rules and regulations for the government of the land and naval
forces and the power to direct where trials may be
held when a crime is not committed within the
United States. However, the fifth amendment provides that: "No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment of indictment of a Grand jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces ......
And the sixth amendment guarantees that: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed .... " The essential question, then, is whether civilian employees of the military services are part of the
"land or naval forces?" The court concluded that
they were because (1) civilian employees are
oftentimes "indispensable" for the operation of
the armed services, and (2) an examination of
legislative history shows that certain civilians,
"suttlers and retainers" to the American Revolutionary Army, were regarded as subject to the
rules and regulations of that army and it may be
inferred that the members of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 were aware of this practice
and meant to include such persons in the broad
phrase "land or naval forces."
The court also examined possible alternatives to
trial by court-martial for overseas civilian employees of the armed services. It might be possible
to set up federal civilian courts overseas to try
these employees, the court said, but there was no
guarantee that the foreign countries would accept
this exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction, and
further, there could be no way of compelling the
attendance of jurors and witnesses. The possibility
of returning civilian offenders to the United States
for trial was also rejected for there was no way
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that witnesses could be compelled to come to this
country to testify and the process would be too
costly and cumbersome for petty offenses. A third
alternative examined was that of turning the
offenders over to foreign courts for trial.
It appeared that the district court was more impressed with the impracticality of any possible
alternatives to court-martial than it was with the
legal arguments involved.
Court Martial Had Jurisdiction Where Soldier
Remained in Army Beyond Minimum Enlistment
Age-The petitioner enlisted in the Army when he
was 15 years old. The defendant's enlistment was
void because the minimum enlistment age, even
with parental consent, was 16 years. After his 17th
birthday the defendant committed a crime and
was convicted by an Army court-martial and sentenced to 12 years at hard labor. He brought a
habeas corpus action in a United States District
Court seeking his release on the ground that his
original enlistment was void and consequently he
was at all times a civilian over whom an Army

court-martial had no jurisdiction. This contention
was denied, the court holding that his enlistment,
though void, "ripened" into a valid enlistment
when he remained in the Army beyond the minimum enlistment age. Barrett v. Looney, 158 F.
Supp. 224 (1958).
There is apparently a conflict among the federal
courts as to whether an enlistment under the
minimum age is absolutely void or merely voidable.
The court in the instant case chose to follow the
line of authority which holds such an enlistment
to be only "voidable." Had the soldier been tried
by the court-martial before he reached the age of
16, the court said there would be no doubt that
the Army would have had no jurisdiction over him.
Since the soldier in this case remained in the Army
after he had reached the age of 16, such acts as
serving on active duty and receiving pay, were
held to be the equivalent of enlistment after that
age.
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes", infra pp. 191-192).

